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a b s t r a c t
There has been growing interest in the concept of safety cases for medical devices and health
information technology, but questions remain about how safety cases can be developed and used
meaningfully in the safety management of healthcare services and processes. The paper presents two
examples of the development and use of safety cases at a service level in healthcare. These ﬁrst practical
experiences at the service level suggest that safety cases might be a useful tool to support service
improvement and communication of safety in healthcare. The paper argues that safety cases might be
helpful in supporting healthcare organisations with the adoption of proactive and rigorous safety
management practices. However, it is also important to consider the different level of maturity of safety
management and regulatory oversight in healthcare. Adaptations to the purpose and use of safety cases
might be required, complemented by the provision of education to both practitioners and regulators.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Healthcare has made signiﬁcant advances in the treatment of a
wide range of diseases. At the same time, it is now widely acknowl-
edged that modern healthcare systems may inﬂict preventable harm
on patients [1,2]. A systematic review of the literature suggests that
around one in ten patients admitted to hospitals around the world
will suffer an adverse event, and that as many as half of these may be
potentially preventable [3]. In addition to the impact on patients, this
has signiﬁcant ﬁnancial implications for healthcare systems in terms
of additional treatment costs and the cost of litigation [4,5].
As a result of this growing body of evidence of patient harm,
healthcare organisations are making continuous progress in their
attempts at understanding and managing risks to patient safety.
For example, the use of Root Cause Analysis for the review of
serious adverse events, and the use of incident reporting to learn
from past experience are now mandatory requirements through-
out the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. Increasingly,
organisations are also adopting proactive analytical methods such
as Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) in order
to anticipate and to assess risk. During the past few years FMECA
or variations thereof have been used in healthcare to assess the
risks associated with, for example, organ procurement and trans-
plantation [6], intravenous drug infusions [7], and communication
in the emergency care pathway [8]. However, it could be argued that
in terms of maturity of safety management systems and practices,
there may still be many valuable lessons to be learned from safety-
critical industries in order to move healthcare organisations towards
more proactive and more rigorous safety management practices.
In safety-critical industries, such as railways and nuclear energy,
regulators require evidence from developers and operators that
they have adopted a thorough and systematic process to under-
stand proactively the risks associated with their systems and to
control these risks appropriately. In the UK, these duties are often
fulﬁlled through the use of safety cases [9]. The adoption of safety
cases marked a shift from compliance-based to more goal-based
regulatory approaches, where the regulator formulates goals, but
the demonstration that these goals have been achieved, and how, is
left to the manufacturer or operator of systems. Under a predomi-
nantly prescriptive regulatory regime, manufacturers and operators
claim safety through the satisfaction of speciﬁc standards and
technical requirements speciﬁed by the regulator. This approach
has been criticised for prompting bureaucratic practices of safety
management, where risks may not be properly understood, and for
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potentially hindering progress in industries that are driven by
technological innovations [10–12]. Broadly speaking, the purpose
of a safety case is to provide a structured argument, supported by a
body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and
valid case that a system is acceptably safe for a given application in
a given context [13]. Safety cases can be structured in different
ways, but key elements are a risk-based argument and the corre-
sponding evidence. The risk-based argument is intended to demon-
strate that all risks associated with a particular system have been
identiﬁed, that appropriate risk controls have been put in place, and
that there are appropriate processes in place to monitor the
effectiveness of the risk controls and the safety performance of
the system on an on-going basis. Safety cases are usually conﬁden-
tial, but there are publicly available safety cases (see for example the
Safety Case Repository [14]). The history of safety cases and safety
case legislation in high-risk industries in the UK has been closely
linked to the occurrence of high proﬁle accidents, such as the
Windscale ﬁre in 1957, which led to the Nuclear Installations Act
1959 (with revision in 1965) that introduced a licensing scheme
along with the requirement for the production of a safety case.
While there has been criticism of the safety case approach [15–17],
the use of safety cases remains an accepted best practice in UK
safety-critical industries as a means to provide rigour and structure
to safety management activities.
There has been some recent interest in the potential applica-
tion of safety cases in healthcare [18]. However, this is limited at
present to the domain of medical devices and health informatics
[19,20], such as the guidance for infusion pumps issued by the US
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) [21] and guidance issued by the
NHS Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) on Clinical
Safety Cases for health informatics products [22,23]. A systematic
review of the published literature suggests that there is a lack of
published empirical evidence of safety case use in healthcare, in
particular at the system or service level, where safety cases have
not been used at all [9]. It is far from clear whether, and if so, how
safety cases might be developed and put to reasonable use at the
healthcare system or service level [18,24]. The organisational and
institutional context in healthcare is very different from safety-
critical industries: the maturity of safety management practices in
healthcare is arguably at a lower level than in traditional safety-
critical industries; there does not exist a notion of acceptable
levels of risk within the healthcare community; and the regulatory
regime is predominantly prescriptive, relying largely on inspection
and routinely collected mortality data.
The aim of this paper is to describe and to reﬂect upon ﬁrst
practical experiences with the development and use of safety
cases in healthcare at a service level. Two examples from a multi-
site service improvement project in the NHS are presented. The
paper argues that safety cases might be helpful in supporting
healthcare organisations with the adoption of proactive and
rigorous safety management practices. However, it is also impor-
tant to consider the different professional, regulatory and cultural
background in healthcare, which might require adaptations to the
purpose and use of safety cases in this domain.
The next section provides background to the service improve-
ment project within which the work was undertaken. Section 3
then describes two examples, where safety cases have been applied
as a service improvement tool and as a safety communication tool.
Section 4 provides a reﬂection on these practical experiences, and
draws out lessons about opportunities and challenges for the use of
safety cases in healthcare settings. Section 5 provides a conclusion
with implications for research and for practice.
2. Safer Clinical Systems – a context for exploring the use of
safety cases
Safer Clinical Systems (SCS) is a service improvement pro-
gramme supported by the Health Foundation, and facilitated by a
technical support team at Warwick University Medical School in
conjunction with eight collaborating sites in the NHS. The pro-
gramme has been running over ﬁve years since 2008, including an
exploratory Phase I and an application Phase II (three years), which
has been completed at the end of 2013. The speciﬁc aim of the work
was to explore a new approach (in the context of healthcare) to
improving patient safety. SCS combines methods from improvement
science and safety engineering, and learning from high reliability
organisations, to identify hazards and associated risks in a deﬁned
health delivery pathway through a structured process of analysis.
Interventions aimed at eliminating, mitigating or controlling risks are
then implemented and evaluated. The unique features of the SCS
approach for the health sector could be described as:
 A systems perspective, incorporating the interdependencies,
culture and context of inﬂuencing factors.
 A proactive and rigorous search for hazards and associated risks.
 An application of human factors thinking and speciﬁc tools as
transferred from other industries.
The programme is delivered in four steps, which in this
instance were managed by the Warwick technical support team
to ensure that NHS sites progressed at a relatively similar rate. The
four steps are shown in Table 1.
The SCS approach lends itself to providing some of the information
typically used in safety cases to support claims about system safety.
After a trial run with one study site during phase 1 of SCS, the
subsequent phase 2 of SCS introduced study sites to the safety case
concept putting emphasis on some key aspects from the literature [9]:
 Structured thinking and argument about hazards, risk and safety
status.
 Integrating various sources of evidence as derived from the
safety management activities.
Table 1
Overview of the SCS safety improvement approach.
Step Description
I – Pathway deﬁnition This step includes the identiﬁcation and description of the care pathway, its boundaries and relationships with other departments and
organisations, and an assessment of the organisational safety culture.
II – System diagnosis This step includes mapping of the process, the analysis of activities using Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), and an assessment of
vulnerabilities using FMECA. Speciﬁc reliability and performance measures are also established to serve as baseline for subsequent outcome
assessments.
III – Option appraisal This step includes the identiﬁcation of a set of potential interventions linked to the hazard and risk information. Interventions are then
subjected to an appraisal process to select candidate interventions for implementation.
IV – System improvement
cycles
In this step the interventions that were selected as part of Step III are implemented with associated measures of reliability, risk reduction
and outcomes.
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 Making the implicit explicit about the safety of particular pathways.
 Offering a means of communication to various stakeholders.
The SCS programme represented a collective programme inwhich
the eight NHS sites worked to a common time schedule and were
introduced to the use of a number of analytic tools – from the human
factors literature and practice. The tools were used in the analytic
phase of SCS, and were aimed at enabling sites (many for the ﬁrst
time) to analyse their care delivery pathway, identify hazards within
the pathway, assess the associated risks, and consider some form of
intervention to eliminate, control or mitigate these risks. Within the
collaborative framework of the SCS programme, it became a require-
ment on sites to present the information they had gathered to
different stakeholders, such as other members of the clinical team,
the chief executive and other senior managers of their organisation,
other teams within the SCS programme, and more broadly to
healthcare practitioners outside of their organisation.
Initially, collaborating sites were given some freedom, in terms
of presentation, to link their SCS work to the safety case report.
Over three iterations, a safety case report template was deﬁned,
with the following sections:
1. Title: the pathway or focus of the case.
2. Background: the information available to form our safety claim
or evaluation of the current system.
3. Assurance statement: the pathway has been assessed and is
described as safe to an agreed extent.
4. Risks and Control Mechanisms: a history of hazards, associated
risks and control measures
5. The Residual Risks: description of signiﬁcant uncontrolled risks.
6. Action: being taken, or needing to be taken.
7. Sources/conﬁdence: an evaluation of the robustness of and
conﬁdence in the basis of the argument presented.
It was this framework that formed the basis of the production
of the two examples presented below.
3. Examples
3.1. Example 1: safe shared care of patients undergoing surgery on a
renal unit
The ﬁrst example is drawn from work that was undertaken on
the Renal Unit at a hospital within North Bristol NHS Trust. The
Renal Unit serves a population of 1.57 million patients. It admits
around 450 patients for surgery annually. The project aimed to
improve the safety of shared care arrangements between the renal
medicine team and the surgical team for patients with Established
Renal Failure (ERF). The main drivers for the project were previous
adverse events. Root Cause Analysis carried out on these adverse
events prior to the project exposed inadequacies in the commu-
nication between the two clinical teams. The work was under-
taken from February 2012 to December 2013.
3.1.1. Service description
Patients with ERF have diverse clinical needs, relating to dialysis,
electrolyte and ﬂuid management and appropriate prescribing. As
such, these patients remain the primary responsibility of the renal
team with pre- and post-operative surgical care delivered on the
renal ward, and surgeons visiting rather than having primary
responsibility for the patient. Multiple informal unstructured hand-
overs occur at various stages of patient care. The corresponding
high-level patient pathway is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3.1.2. Purpose of the safety case
In this organisation the predominant approach to safety man-
agement was reactive with a focus on harm rather than risk.
Improvement activities were usually triggered by the review of
adverse events leading to speciﬁc improvement interventions.
These were not normally based on an in-depth risk analysis. There
are no regulatory requirements mandating the use of safety cases,
and the project was an improvement project. As such, the role of
safety cases in the project was as an improvement tool. The safety
case concept was adopted in order to encourage a proactive
mindset, and to provide structure to proactive safety management
activities. The safety case reports and the associated evidence were
also intended to be a document repository of knowledge, which
should become embedded in the department. As there are no
criteria for determining acceptability of risk, the aim of the project,
and the high-level safety claim, was articulated modestly as: “G0:
Shared care arrangements between renal medicine teams and surgi-
cal teams for patients with ERF are safer than currently, i.e. the risk
associated with the pathway is reduced”. This high-level claim is
broken down into two sub-claims. One consists of a risk argument
intended to demonstrate that the main risks have been reduced.
The other consists of a conﬁdence argument intended to demon-
strate that there is sufﬁcient rigour in the safety management
activities that were carried out to produce the evidence. Fig. 2
provides a graphical representation of this high-level argument in
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
3.1.3. Risk argument
The sub-goal for the risk argument is: “G1: The key risks associated
with the pathway have been reduced”. The argument proceeds over a
partial safety management life cycle by demonstrating that all risks
have been understood (G1.1), the key risks have been controlled to
Unexpected
Expected
Preadmission phase
Admission under 
care of renal 
team to renal ward
Inpatient care Operation Post operative care Discharge
Assessment
Decision to operate
Pre op assessment
Higher level 
of dependency
Ward care
Recovery
Pathway boundaries
Fig. 1. High-level pathway for shared care arrangements.
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reasonable levels (G1.2), and that operational performance of the
system has improved (G1.3). The argument remains partial, as there
does not exist a mature safety management system [25] within the
organisation that would ensure adequate safety policy, safety assur-
ance and safety promotion. A simple graphical overview is given in
Fig. 3
Sub-goal G1.1 is broken down into two claims to demonstrate
that relevant hazards have been identiﬁed (G1.1.1) and that the
risks associated with the hazards have been evaluated (G.1.1.2).
The evidence to support both these sub-claims comes from
previous experience (Root Cause Analysis of adverse events),
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) carried out
on the process map, and Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA)
carried out on a hierarchical task analysis (HTA) representation.
The FMECA and PHEA provided risk scores based on expert
consensus. In total, 99 hazards and associated risks were identi-
ﬁed. The hazards were ordered according to the risk scores, and
the six highest-ranking hazards were selected for further investi-
gation. Table 2 provides a summary of these.
Sub-goal G1.2 (risk controls) has not been broken down further,
but is supported directly by evidence from an options appraisal.
The options appraisal consisted of a focus group session with a
representative set of stakeholders in the pathway to identify and
to select appropriate risk control interventions based on a number
of dimensions, such as the amount of risk reduction likely to be
achieved, cost of the intervention, time required to develop the
intervention, ease with which measures for the intervention could
be speciﬁed etc.
Finally, sub-goal G1.3 (operational performance) was broken
down into two further sub-claims, namely that suitable measures
have been identiﬁed for all key hazards (G.1.3.1), and that the
measures over time demonstrate an improvement (G1.3.2). The
evidence for G.1.3.1 comes from the options appraisal, where the
measures were developed. The evidence for G1.3.2 comes from
process audits carried out at regular intervals.
Fig. 4 presents an example of an audit carried out for Hazard 01.
The hazard relates to situations where there is no documented
review by a senior doctor pre-operatively. The absence of such a
review can have many consequences, such as delays in treatment,
unrecognised levels of risk, and incomplete knowledge of patient
condition, which can result in unnecessary tests and interventions,
patient harm and poor patient experience. Potential causes for the
occurrence of the hazard include high levels of workload, low level
of priority attached to this activity, and a lack of knowledge about
the importance of the activity. It is also possible that the pre-
operative assessment takes place, but remains undocumented.
Interventions to control the risk associated with the hazard were:
introduction of a formal policy and preoperative assessment clinic;
and a change to the admissions forms to include a dedicated
preoperative assessment box. The audit carried out over 46-week
period shows that the reliability of this activity varies greatly from
week to week, and that the interventions (introduced in week 31)
have been unsuccessful thus far in in bringing about sustainable
and high levels of reliability.
3.1.4. Conﬁdence argument
The sub-goal for the conﬁdence argument is: “G2: The evidence
produced by the safety management activities is sufﬁciently trust-
worthy”. The sufﬁciency criterion was determined qualitatively
through consensus of the project team and through external
expert review. This claim has not been broken down further.
Instead it provides as evidence simple descriptions of how the
different safety activities referred to in sub-goal G1 have been
carried out. Limitations and gaps in the conﬁdence of individual
safety management activities are also noted.
As an implicit argument, there were two main strategies for
ensuring trustworthiness of the evidence produced, which ran
through most of the safety management activities. On the one
hand, hazard identiﬁcation, risk analysis and the design of risk
controls all attempted to involve a broad and representative set of
stakeholders in the pathway. On the other hand, all ﬁndings were
continuously presented to, and reviewed and critiqued by external
experts (external to the site) from the SCS Warwick technical
support team over the duration of the project lifetime. Limitations
included difﬁculties in engaging staff, and in bringing together
representative sets of staff for the risk analysis and options appraisal
focus groups.
G0: Shared care arrangements between 
renal medicine and surgical teams for ERF 
patients are safer than before
Context: Pathway description
Constraint: Risk associated with 
pathway is reduced
Justification: RCA exposed inadequacies 
in communication between the two teams
G1: Key risks in pathway 
have been reduced
G2: Safety management activities were 
conducted with sufficient rigour
Argument: Risks have been managed and 
there is sufficient confidence in the evidence
Evidence: Descriptions 
of how activities have 
been carried out
Evidence: List of 
gaps and limitations
Fig. 2. High-level safety argument.
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3.1.5. Lessons about risk
The residual risk in the pathway following the improvement
activities remains high. While certain performance measures have
improved, others have not despite the safety management activ-
ities that have been carried out. Reasons for this may be the
prototypical nature of many of the interventions that require
further development iterations, as well as difﬁculties experienced
in engaging all staff. This also implies that some of the qualitative
evidence based on expert judgement and consensus is not as
trustworthy as would be required to produce a strong and convin-
cing argument. The safety case also acknowledges that there are
many risks that have been identiﬁed, but have not been included in
the risk control stage.
3.2. Example 2: safe transfer of responsibility and accountability of
medical services (daytime) to the Hospital at Night service
The second example is drawn fromwork that was conducted at
Birmingham Children's hospital, which serves both the local
community, for standard care, as well as providing highly specia-
lised tertiary level services. The focus was the clinical handover
from all medical daytime services to a Hospital at Night (HaN)
team. The main drivers for the project were the Trust Board focus
on handover as a speciﬁc area for safety improvement, and the
learning derived from previous incident reports that suggested that
33% of incidents reported occurred between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., a
period where the HaN pathway is active within the hospital. The
work was undertaken between February 2012 and December 2013.
3.2.1. Service description
The handover from the day service covers all 13 medical
specialties and, therefore, a large and wide spectrum of informa-
tion, to a much smaller cross covering team of doctors, advanced
nurse practitioners and senior nurse coordinators. The aim of the
handover process is to facilitate prioritisation of workload and
proactive monitoring of patients deemed to be at risk of deteriora-
tion. The size of the transfer content and inaccuracies results in a
great deal of individual error recovery along the pathway of care.
As a consequence, there can be many wasteful requests for clinical
reviews of patients by the HaN team to re-establish the level of
risk. The high-level handover pathway is described in Fig. 5.
G1.1: All risks have 
been understood
G1.2 : Key risks have been 
controlled to reasonable levels
G1.3: Operational performance 
of the pathway has improved
G1.1.2: Risks associated 
with hazards have been 
evaluated
G1.1.1: All relevant 
hazards have been 
identified
G1.2.2: Risk controls 
for key risks have 
been specified and 
are adequate
G1.2.1 Key risks have
been identified
G1.3.2: Measures show 
improvement over time
G1.3.1: Suitable measures 
have been identified
Evidence: 
RCA
Evidence: 
FMECA
Evidence: 
PHEA
Evidence: 
HTA
Evidence: 
Process Map
Evidence: 
List of
measures
Evidence: 
Options
appraisal
Evidence: 
Process 
audits
Evidence: 
List of
key risks
G1: Key risks in pathway 
have been reduced
Argument : A partial safety management 
life cycle has been executed
Fig. 3. Risk argument.
Table 2
Main hazards identiﬁed (example 1).
Hazard ID Description
01 No documented medical review by senior doctor pre-operatively
02 No documented surgical plan pre-operatively
03 Appropriate haemodialysis not organised
04 Correct surgeon, operation and safety behaviours in theatre not documented
05 Requirements for safe discharge not met
06 Documented surgical review not provided post-operatively
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3.2.2. Purpose of the safety case
Each day service provides a written handover sheet, but in
varying formats, multiple locations and no audit trail of amend-
ments. No formal controls existed to check the material, and the
HaN team added amendments by hand. The organisation was
seeking an approach to enhance the safety of the handover process
(hence participation in the SCS programme) and was seeking to
establish with the Trust Board and Executive Management Team
the challenges faced within the handover process. Although there
was no prior experience of the safety case methodology, it was
used here as a communication tool about safety to the Board – a
statement of the current risk position. The safety case report does
not attempt to demonstrate acceptable safety of the handover
pathway; rather it claims that key vulnerabilities have been
understood, and supports this through a comprehensive exposi-
tion of risks. The safety case report follows, however, a similar
structure as the safety case report developed in example 1 (see
Fig. 2). This entails an argument about the level of risk, and an
argument about the level of conﬁdence in the safety management
activities that provide the evidence for the risk argument.
3.2.3. Risk argument
The risk argument in the current version of the safety case
report provides a modest claim and corresponding evidence that
the risks associated with the HaN handover pathway have been
understood. This is comparable to sub-goal G1.1 in example 1. As
in that case, the evidence to support this claim comes from
previous experience as well as from the techniques used within
the SCS programme (Process Mapping, HTA, FMECA, PHEA). The
FMECA and PHEA provided risk scores based on expert consensus.
In total, 123 hazards and associated risks were identiﬁed. The
hazards were ordered according to the risk scores. Review of the
hazards and associated risk scores led to the identiﬁcation of three
high-risk areas within the pathway, see Table 3. Existing risk
mitigation measures were also identiﬁed.
3.2.4. Conﬁdence argument
The conﬁdence argument followed the same strategy as that
described in example 1. Safety management activities were under-
taken collaboratively with staff working in the handover pathway.
Focus groups with staff were held, and input from individuals with
knowledge of the handover system at the organisation was sought.
Identical patterns of high-risk areas were identiﬁed independently
across the different specialties.
The project sought the engagement of executive, senior man-
agement, and both senior and junior clinical staff. A stakeholder
analysis informed the development of the Communication Strat-
egy, which has guided the project in engaging key groups of staff.
However, involvement of junior doctors was low.
3.2.5. Lessons about risk
There is a high-level assumption that the current handover
pathway is safe; in that harm is not routinely caused to a large
number of patients as a direct result of handover. However, there
remains a high level of residual risk, and the system may not be as
safe as outcome data implies. The risk analysis has demonstrated
that within the whole HaN system there is a high rate of error
production that is mitigated by high error recovery rate at multi-
ple steps along the pathway. This overreliance on the individual
leaves the handover process fallible to performance inﬂuencing
factors.
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
Week
Intervention Period
% of patients having 
senior medical review
Fig. 4. Audit data of senior medical review.
Day 
services 
deliver 
clinical care
Identify 
information 
to hand 
over
Handover 
to HaN
team
HaN team 
delivers 
clinical care
Identify 
information 
to hand 
over
Handover 
to day 
services
Fig. 5. High-level pathway for handover to Hospital at Night team.
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4. Discussion
The two examples described how the use of safety cases might
support healthcare organisations in adopting a proactive, risk-
driven approach to safety management at the service level. In both
examples, the pathway had previously been tacitly assumed to be
safe due to the low number of patients that were actually harmed.
However, a large number of incident reports suggested that both
pathways might not be as safe as the outcome data alone would
lead to believe. The safety case approach supported the organisa-
tions in deﬁning the pathways, understanding and ranking risks in
a proactive way, whilst engaging the workforce in safety manage-
ment activities. However, with such complex “legacy” systems that
had evolved over many years, the number of risks uncovered was
overwhelming, and the organisations found it challenging to make
a safety claim about their pathways, because the work focused so
much on the now explicitly uncovered and largely accepted risks.
In particular, the organisations found it difﬁcult to claim that the
system had reached an acceptable level of safety because of the
new understanding of the risk within the pathway. As a result, the
safety claims and the safety cases were used as improvement tools
and as communication tools providing an exposition of risk, rather
than as approval or certiﬁcation instruments.
Commonly, the high-level safety claim made in safety case
reports of industrial systems states that the system under con-
sideration is acceptably safe to operate for a given purpose and in a
given environment [26]. In the UK the acceptability criterion is
often determined through the application of the As Low as Reason-
ably Practicable (ALARP) principle [27]. However, in healthcare no
comparable approach exists at the service level (there are stan-
dards for medical devices [28] and for health informatics products
[22,23]). In fact, regulatory guidance often does not operate with
the notion of risk as such, but rather speciﬁes events that should
not happen (so called “never events”), such as wrong site surgery
or wrong route administration of chemotherapy [29]. This regula-
tory environment potentially presents a challenge to the successful
and widespread use of safety cases. When healthcare organisa-
tions are “exposing” their levels of risk in a safety case, they need
reassurance that they would not be regarded as less safe by the
regulator, or even be penalised for this [18]. Ideally, the systematic
exposition of the presence of risk should be regarded as an
indication of the growing maturity and safety awareness of health-
care organisations.
Safety Management Systems (SMS) [25] are not well estab-
lished in healthcare organisations, and the level of maturity of
their safety management activities is arguably signiﬁcantly lower
than, for example, in aviation. Safety management in healthcare is
still predominantly reactive. On the one hand, this provides an
opportunity for the use of safety cases to contribute a framework
and a structure to the safety management activities. On the other
hand, the need for the provision of rigorous and comprehensive
evidence may appear daunting and potentially overly resource
intensive in a healthcare environment that is facing serious chal-
lenges in terms of staff shortages, high levels of workload, and often
long waiting times for patients. This is exacerbated by the fact that
there is little published evidence of the direct contribution of safety
cases to improved safety performance [16,17]. There is a danger that
safety case development might be regarded as a costly intervention
without established evidence base—and hence not be promoted at
senior management level.
Recent criticism of safety case use in industry following the Nimrod
Review [15] into the loss of a Royal Air Force aircraft in Afghanistan in
2006 highlighted that safety cases should not be regarded as a panacea
for successful safety management. The review criticised that the dev-
elopment of safety cases had degenerated into a “tick-box exercise” and
that the culture had been one of paper safety at the expense of real
safety. In a healthcare environment, it is easy to see similar challenges
arising. NHS organisations are collecting a wealth of quality and safety
data, such as data about serious untoward incidents (“never events”) or
data about common forms of harm (through the NHS Safety Thermo-
meter). However, there is often a disconnect between safety managers
and this type of data on the one hand, and front line staff working in
clinical reality on the other hand. The Nimrod Review further criticised
the lack of involvement of frontline operators. In healthcare, similar
concerns have been raised in the literature, suggesting that there is a
continuing lack of clinical engagement in safety improvement activities
[30]. The engagement of junior doctors, who deliver a lot of the actual
frontline medical care, might be particularly problematic, as they
usually spend only a short amount of time in a particular environment
before they rotate again. However, this group potentially has particular
incentives to participate in safety improvement activities that could be
exploited by contributing to their education and professional portfolios.
A review of safety case practices in industry found that the lack
of experience and expertise with safety cases and the underlying
safety management activities formed a signiﬁcant threat to the
successful adoption of the approach [9]. This will be particularly
relevant in a healthcare context where many of the safety manage-
ment activities that are well established in industry are largely
unknown to practitioners. Trust Boards, patient safety and quality
managers, and frontline staff all require some degree of education
in order to engage with, contribute to and understand proactive
approaches to safety management. This applies also to regulators,
who are responsible for providing stimulus and guidance to
healthcare organisations. Technical knowledge of the correspond-
ing methods and tools is one aspect, but arguably a proactive
orientation in itself is the key requirement. In the examples, the
use of safety cases was intended to contribute towards achieving
this mindset.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we reﬂected on practical experiences with the
development and use of safety cases at the service level in
healthcare settings. Healthcare organisations require support with
the adoption of proactive and systematic safety management
practices that are a key feature of safety-critical industries. Safety
cases might have the potential to provide structure and a proactive
Table 3
High-risk areas and existing risk mitigation identiﬁed in the HaN handover pathway
Risk area Description Existing risk mitigation
Synthesis of
information pre-
handover
Failure to synthesise information into packaged clinical intelligence during
handover process, e.g. identiﬁcation of “at risk” patients.
Preparatory meetings before handover, but practices vary
greatly.
Communication of
information
Failure of information communication during handover preparation and
handover process, e.g. not delivering up to date information.
Structured communication protocols, but this is not widely
adopted and of variable quality when used.
Fidelity of written
information
Failure of written information entry onto the handover documents, e.g.
information inaccurate, incomplete or outdated.
No formal risk controls; HaN team members adopt
workarounds using hand written annotations.
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mindset to healthcare organisations' safety management activities.
However, it is unlikely that safety cases can be adopted in the
same way as they are used in safety-critical industries due to the
different professional, regulatory and cultural background in
healthcare. Systems in healthcare have evolved over many years
and many risks are accepted. There is no formal notion of what
constitutes an acceptable level of risk. The maturity of safety
management activities is comparably low, and the safety manage-
ment approach is predominantly reactive. In the two examples
described in the paper, we have outlined possible ways in which
safety cases might be used in a healthcare context: as a service
improvement tool and as a safety communication tool, rather than
as an instrument to demonstrate that services are “acceptably safe”.
There is, in addition, a need for empirical evidence of the impact
of the adoption of safety cases on performance and outcomes, as
well as on culture. This should be combined with education about
proactive safety management to Trust Boards and regulators in
particular, as these groups are best placed to initiate change.
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